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ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL ISSUES
IN HOMELAND SECURITY – WHAT THEY
ARE AND HOW TO ADDRESS THEM
Alexander Siedschlag

Homeland security is a nation‐wide effort, including all of
government across federal, state, local, territorial and tribal
tiers; the public and the private sector; and the whole community, with each single citizen. The overarching homeland
security vision comprises safeguarding the American way of
life and is embedded into the goals of the National Security
Strategy that include respect for universal values at home and
abroad. It thus is evident that ethical, legal, and social – or
ELSI – issues are important to consider. This chapter discusses the origins and essence of ELSI and explores ELSI
integration into everyday homeland security. Two defining
debates are reviewed: homeland security legislation (specifically the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the USA FREEDOM
Act of 2015) and domestic surveillance, with related use of
technology such as “drones.” Subsequently, the relevance of
ELSI is summarized across prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery missions. After adding some
examples of how ELSI are addressed in other countries’ civil
security policy, best practices to effectively address ELSI, as
well as limitations of ELSI integration in homeland security,
are discussed.
Homeland Security is strategically defined as a “concerted national effort”.1 This means a nationwide effort, including
all of government across federal, state, local, territorial and
tribal tiers; the public and the private sector; and the whole
community, with each single citizen.2 The overarching “homeland security vision” is “[a] homeland that is safe, secure, and

r esilient against terrorism and other hazards, where American
interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive.”3 Homeland
security is integrated into the goals of the National Security Strategy (2015) that include respect for universal values
at home and abroad. 4 From all of this, is evident that
ethical, legal, and social issues – referred to as ELSI – have
an important role to play in the homeland security enterprise
throughout its mission space.
This chapter starts with a discussion of the origins and
essence of ELSI as a generic concept, and then explains how
it relates to homeland security. It defines the concept’s three
components – ethical, legal, and social – and explores main
ELSI domains in homeland security in the United States,
based on the evolution of the definition of homeland security
itself. Security culture is then introduced as a frame of reference to assess and address ELSI. After that, the chapter
discusses why ELSI consideration is important in homeland
security today, based on current strategic concepts in the
context of the all‐hazards and whole‐community approach.
Then, two defining debates are visited as examples: homeland security legislation (specifically the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001 and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015) and the Constitution; and domestic surveillance, with related use of technology such as “drones.” Subsequently, the relevance of ELSI is
summarized across the five national preparedness mission
areas of homeland security: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. After adding some international
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examples of how ELSI are addressed in countries’ homeland
security, home affairs, or civil security policies and strategies,
the chapter concludes with a summary of ways to effectively
address ELSI in the national effort of all‐hazards based
homeland security, as well as a discussion of the limitations
of ELSI.

THE ORIGINS AND ESSENCE OF ELSI
Due consideration of ethical, legal, and social issues is
essential but not specific to homeland security law, policy,
and practice. ELSI were known and discussed before 9/11
and the era of homeland security. They are in fact part of a
moral discourse that transcends the borders of the nation
state.5 In particular the interaction of technology and society
has always been assessed from the point of view of law and
ethics, and across national boundaries. Technology assessment that addresses the effects of new products and processes
on society and explores the social acceptance and ethical
acceptability of new technologies has been applied for quite
some time to fields such as nuclear technology, pharmacology,
gene technology, or artificial intelligence, just to name a
few.6 Moreover, ethical aspects have long been addressed
in strategic planning processes.7 ELSI as a specific concept
was first introduced to denote a component in the Human
Genome Project (HGP), active from 1990 to 2003, that
assessed ethical, legal, and societal implications of the
newfound genetic knowledge.8
Today, ELSI has expanded into a universal concept used
in science and technology research to address compliance
and societal acceptance issues in military and national security research, in particular related to unanticipated military
uses of technology and crossovers of military technological
solutions to civilian use.9 This for example includes informed
consent, data protection, and risk‐benefit assessment for
research involving human subjects; ownership and use to
purpose of data; potential of data to allow identification of
individuals rather than just providing cluster information,
such as supporting the right of individual self‐determination;
and assessing and addressing potential for dual (civil and
military) use and misuse (e.g., terrorist abuse) of research
results. Common related procedures to address ELSI aspects
in science and technology research include self‐control by
researchers and professional associations; safeguards and
codes of conduct, including addressing of wider (societal)
impact of research results; institutional review and audit systems; as well as legally rooted mechanisms, such as data
protection and harmonization of terminologies and legal
standards to support compliance.10
Broader conceptions have related ELSI to the entire
spectrum of “emergency research ethics,” addressing how
scientific study of individuals and populations experiencing calamity can and should “protect and promote the
well‐being and autonomy of research participants, researchers,

science and society as a whole […], while allowing and
encouraging research to take place that will benefit members of society through the production of knowledge or
new […] interventions.”11 This concept – mutatis mutandis –
is quite directly applicable to the function of ELSI in the
practice of homeland security, simply by shifting the focus
from “research” in the preceding paragraph to “policy.”
Issues such as consent (provide information and p rotect
autonomy and well‐being), due consideration of vulnerable
populations, public consultation and addressing of public
risk perception (not merely objectively assessed risk), and
the quality of governance and regulation are examples of
pervasive ethical, legal, and social issues in homeland
security strategy as well as everyday policy.
The relevance of ELSI to U.S. homeland security has
substantially increased following the evolution of homeland
security policy definitions. Those definitions now include a
focus on securing society and all of its values. At the same
time, current definitions underscore that homeland security
is not a single‐department activity but an interagency as well
as a whole‐community responsibility, aimed at creating the
capabilities required to carry out specific missions to ensure
preparedness and foster a resilient nation.
The first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review of 2010
introduced the concept of the “homeland security enterprise.”12 The homeland security enterprise refers to the
collective efforts and shared responsibilities of federal, state,
local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private‐sector
partners – as well as individuals, families, and communities –
to maintain critical homeland security capabilities. It connotes
a broad‐based community with a common interest in the
safety and well‐being of America and American society.
The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review then
defined the “homeland security vision” as follows: “A homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and
other hazards, where American interests, aspirations, and
way of life can thrive.”13 The bandwidth of homeland security response to a very broad threat horizon, as well as the
quite extensive perimeter of protection encompassing the
whole way of life of the American society, indicate the huge
variety of ethical, legal, and social issues to consider.
ELSI COMPONENTS DEFINED
In brief, each of the ELSI components may be defined as
follows:
Ethical issues – “The field of ethics (or moral philosophy)
involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behaviour.”14 Ethical issues describe
the space defined by the study of moral obligation that is
available to achieve coherence of security with political and
societal preferences.15
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That space can be broken down into three distinct
systems, as explained by Naomi Zack in her Ethics for
Disaster:16 consequentialism, deontology (or duty ethics),
and virtue ethics. Consequentialism entails results that are
the most important moral factor. Deontology or duty ethics
requires that we always follow certain moral principles,
regardless of the result. Virtue ethics is the moral system
based on the common values regarded as typical of a good
character of individuals. It may appear as if the three components of ELSI may be best addressed with one particular
of the three moral systems referred to above. Ethical issues
may appear to be best responded to by virtue (values ethics);
legal issues by deontology; and social issues by consequentialism, focused on the actual effects on people. However,
why it seems logical to split use of moral systems according
to the character of the issue, this will in most cases not be
adequate to the practical problems at stake. Because ELSI
issues rarely exist in separation from each other in homeland security that is all‐hazards based and whole‐community driven, philosophically sound as well as pragmatically
adequate addressing of them will most likely be based on a
combination of elements from the three moral systems.
Legal issues – Consideration of legal issues in their embeddedness with ethical and social issues is based on John Stuart
Mill’s concept of liberty as defined in On Liberty (1863):17 the
limit that must be set on society’s power over each individual.
As part of ELSI, reflection on legal issues mainly serves
to duly consider the criticism of homeland security intrusion: encroaching of constitutionally protected citizen rights
and freedoms without a proportional security payoff, thus
not serving the security of the people but infringing liberty.18
Legal issues consideration therefore focuses on balancing of
values as well as on distributive justice: Homeland security
capabilities should not include as a consequence the uneven
distribution of security in society, safeguarding some parts
of it more than others, or securing some while making others
more vulnerable (to hazards or to an imbalance between
security and liberty).
Social issues – Whereas ethical aspects are often seen to
cover the moral acceptability of homeland security technologies and practices, social aspects often are regarded to
address societal acceptance.19 This is an important perspective because technology not only can contribute to security
but also create new vulnerabilities. It also has the potential to
change human behavior and to drive the evolution of security cultures. However, social issues transcend that scope.
The social issues component in ELSI really relates to the
whole‐community approach to homeland security, defending a society’s commonly acquired values, following Arnold
Wolfers’ classical “subjective” definition of national security as a concept that measures “the absence of fear that such
values will be attacked.”20
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For example, defending values and the nation’s heritage
is an important ingredient of homeland security as seen by
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and reflected in
the “homeland security vision” put forward in the 2014
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.21 Addressing social
issues therefore requires adequate concepts within the
framework of a whole‐community approach. It requires
focusing attention on the real security needs of society and
disaster‐struck communities, as opposed to bureaucratic and
political construction of disaster.22 It emphasizes the respect
for and response to human and societal needs, and citizen
ownership of homeland security, as citizens are its ultimate
end‐users, or beneficiaries.
SECURITY CULTURE AS A FRAMEWORK
FOR ASSESSING AND ADDRESSING ELSI
ELSI considerations do not merely replicate philosophical,
legal, and social studies of security. Instead, they look at
ethical, legal, and social issues of enduring foundations of
homeland security as well as the current practice of homeland security in an integrative way, considering the embeddedness of homeland security into a tridimensional ethical,
legal, and social context. In doing so, ELSI analysis assumes
that the definition of, and response to, “the greatest risks” (as
per the National Preparedness Goal)23 is not only evidence
based, but also culturally driven.24 Thus, security is neither
implementation of the obvious nor ontological, but an ongoing controversy. A way to combine those aspects within one
model for analysis is offered by the concept of security culture. Security cultures can be summarized as comprising the
following four categories:25
• Normative values: security cultures as ideational
representation of foundational decisions about basic
normative values (e.g. the security vs. liberty and freedom debate), which shape the normative arena in which
homeland security takes place.
• Knowledge and interpretation: security cultures as a
cognitive form by which members of social communities make sense of reality, attribute meaning to facts as
well as save and reproduce practical competencies (e.g.
the societal resilience debate).
• Common symbols: security cultures as shared symbols
on which citizens orient their action and which are a
kind of software for operating interfaces between actors
and overarching structures (i.e., federal, state, local,
territorial and tribal agencies), flexible enough to
reflect and adapt to new threats and challenges.
• Action repertories: security cultures as sets of individual (or proprietary), experience‐based strategies associated to individual attributions of meaning and normative
convictions.
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Security culture as a concept allows considering relevant
ELSI aspects in their mutual relationship, such as public perception of risk, of legitimacy of statecraft and homeland
security policy and capabilities, as well as societal acceptance of homeland security measures. A risk management
doctrine at federal department level, as pursued by the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS),26 is not enough.
In addition, an evidence based approach is necessary, including
social and cultural aspects of risk assessment and management. This touches the very core of homeland security, since
[p]ublic perception, more than critical infrastructure, airports, or national historical sites, it the real target of terrorist
attacks. Manipulating public perception and exaggerating
their capability to do harm are terrorists’ primary weapons.
In order to be effective, terrorists need to arouse fear of their
organizations and leaders. They target that fear by attacking
the public’s confidence in its national leadership’s ability to
protect society from the unpredictable and indiscriminate
nature of their attacks.”27

An important application area of security culture analysis
in order to address, or if possible prevent, ethical, legal, and
social concerns is risk management for homeland security.
From the ELSI point of view, such risk assessment should be
rooted in rational threat assessment and in addition consider
socially informed priorities and social processes of risk
perception:
“Risk and the perception of risk […] influence public attitudes about homeland security, and these public attitudes
consequently influence policy makers. Homeland security
agencies must therefore respond to not only the threats of
which they are aware, but also to the values and attitudes
present among the public that they protect.”28

Moreover, homeland security has always been a societal
enterprise, long before the term was coined and the whole
community principle invoked:
“Throughout America’s existence […], homeland security
has been an integral part of our communities. From our early
history onward, Americans responded to threats and disasters by offering assistance to one another, and by uniting as
a whole to protect our way of life from enemy forces. Long
before professional fire departments and police forces,
churches, civic organizations, families and neighbors served
as our first responders to natural and man‐made dangers.”29

As well, ELSI had been discussed with relation to securing the nation and its people long before the term of homeland security came into use.30 A particularly timely example
is airport security and balancing state of the art passenger
screening with the risk of ending up performing unconstitutional searches. As the President’s Commission on Aviation
Security and Terrorism,31 created by President George Bush

to address the broader security context of the Pan Am Flight
103 (Lockerbie) bombing of 1988, had already discussed,
denser, science and technology supported airport security
measures correlate with more restrictions on fundamental
freedoms. Further, the Commission report addressed ethical
aspects, such as accumulating huge numbers of passengers
for extended amounts of time landside, in the departure hall,
which is one of the least secure spaces in an airport, following intensified airside target hardening measures such as
multiple identity checks and questioning.32
Today’s approach of fast security lanes for frequent flyers
as well as the U.S. Transportation Security Authority’s TSA
PreCheck program, both allowing passengers to clear the
less secure departure hall area faster than the common passenger, is another example of how ELSI can help identify
paradoxes in homeland security, such as the uneven distribution of security among people based on security‐enhancing
measures.
MAIN ELSI DOMAINS
This section identifies main ELSI domains: typical areas
where those issues come up in strategic perspective, as well
as in everyday homeland security efforts. As mentioned,
although not always termed as such, ELSI have been analyzed since the creation of the homeland security enterprise,
as well as pre‐dating it. Homeland security today represents a
functional policy area found in different countries, although
its institutional setup in the U.S. is still singular.33 U.S. homeland security has increasingly focused on broader functional
aspects of the mission space. Definitions have evolved
• from homeland security being “a concerted national
effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United
States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do
occur”34;
• over additionally addressing the “full range of potential
catastrophic events, including man‐made and natural
disasters”35;
• to homeland security as the “intersection of evolving
threats and hazards with traditional governmental and
civic responsibilities for civil defense, emergency
response, law enforcement, customs, border patrol, and
immigration.”36
The scope, content, and relevance of ELSI have evolved
accordingly, making ELSI assessment is a competency every
homeland security professional should possess.37 Main
domains of ELSI include the following:38
• Balancing liberty and security in legislation as well as
in policy implementation;
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• Homeland security as an eternal state of emergency that
may infringe constitutional and democratic principles
in the long run;
• Balancing of technological and social issues in surveillance based on ethical net assessment: proportionality
of technology with respect to the intended, and reached,
homeland security outcomes; human review of the
results produced by technology, to avoid subjection of
humans to decisions made by machines only; use of
formal procedure and public input in the decision to
adopt homeland security technology; etc.;
• Potential of abuse: Homeland security technological
solutions may be adopted and abused by criminals and
terrorists;
• Data‐mining and “domestic spying” by government to
collect and use personal data, and the related aspects of
right to privacy, protection from searches including
electronic surveillance, and intelligence gathering on
U.S. persons;
• Indiscriminate subjection large parts of society to generalized suspicion and investigation, for example based
on profiling (such as racial profiling);
• Discriminatory security interventions (where for example a hazard is generalized to be ascribed to all members of certain national origins, faith communities, etc.,
or where homeland security capabilities only are used
to serve risks and interest specific to a certain sector of
society, as opposed to the whole community);
• Use of military courts for civilians and suspending
habeas corpus, thus denying to alleged terrorists any
chance to prove their innocence in court.
Those domains are not typically limited to the homeland
security enterprise in the United States. They are relevant to
and discussed in any country that follows the vision, mission, and goals of security as a public good, created in a
nation‐wide whole community effort to safeguard a society’s
commonly acquired values. ESLI are fundamentally connected to the challenge of making legitimate and just decisions about managing risk to protect democratic society
from a plethora of threats without sacrificing liberty and
freedom. It is important to address ethical and legal issues in
an investigative way since the effects and unintended consequences of homeland security policy decisions and capabilities are sometimes hard to anticipate. The next section will
elaborate on the relevance of ELSI in today’s homeland
security enterprise.
THE RELEVANCE OF ELSI
The new mission statement for the Department of Homeland
Security, released in May 2016, well exemplifies the practical relevance of ELSI. It reads: “With honor and integrity,
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we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and
our values.”39 This can be broken down into the following
dimensions:
• Ethical
• Pursue the department’s mission with “honor and
integrity”;
• Legal
• “balance and preserve,” in enacting the department’s
mission to provide security to the American people,
“freedoms and liberties”40;
• Social
• Intention of the statement to “reflect the views and
values of our employees”41;
• DHS mission to “preserve and promote this Nation’s
immigrant heritage and humanitarian spirit”42.
As importantly, ELSI are intrinsically related to the
whole‐community approach, within in which homeland
security is created as a public good, based on shared
responsibility throughout the homeland security enterprise
that is bound together by national and universal values. In
1952, Arnold Wolfers had defined national security as
defending a society’s commonly acquired values.43 The
2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review put forth
“homeland security vision,” of which defending values
and the nation’s heritage is a cornerstone.44 This leads to a
specific American aspect to the relevance of ELSI as a universal concept, rooted in the living history of the country as
a nation of immigrants:
“Regardless where they were born, it is important to address
homeland security for all U.S. residents. This can be difficult
because the complex social environment which currently
exists must balance how and where we live, the natural environment, technology, and the value‐based world in which we
make decisions regarding public safety and protection.”45

In this context, ELSI consideration is essential for implementation of the whole‐community approach: It is necessary
to ensure social interoperability of homeland security capabilities, enabling them to work across security cultures and
within multicultural settings. The relevance of ELSI thus is
further underscored by main social factors and trends in
American society that contribute to homeland security
decision‐making:46
• Population increase and concentration in big cities,
with more than a quarter of all U.S. citizens living in
ten metropolitan areas with the highest population.47
This increases vulnerability to natural and anthropogenic hazards.
• Population increase of high‐risk areas, in particular
coastal areas, again increasing societal vulnerability.
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• Increase in technology‐related risks, which covers both
new threats in cyberspace as well as in the physical
world, and risks related to, of perceived in association
with, new security technologies, such as full body
scanners.
• An essential homeland security objective, as discussed
above, is defending society’s commonly acquired values.
This normative embeddedness of homeland security
can create vulnerability when at public, policy, and/or
administrative and organizational level, definitions and
objectives for homeland security diverge to an extent
that makes it impossible to agree on effective programs
actually determining and addressing to most imminent
risks. In addition, there is the challenge of balancing
security with other fundamental values such as liberty
and freedom in decision making at federal, state, and
local levels as well as in business decisions in the private sector.
While “vigor of government is essential to the security of
liberty,” as Alexander Hamilton pointed out in Federalist
No. 1,48 ELSI considerations help prevent a “securitization”49
of society, where the value of security becomes unbalanced
and entrenches public life, thus replacing the pursuit of happiness by the people with the pursuit of a virtually limitless
state of emergency by the government:
“Protecting people’s security sometimes involves limiting the
freedoms of a whole population. So long as the operation of
these limitations is kept as short as possible and imposed in
order to protect important rights, such as the right to life, even
human rights law permits them. Human rights law recognizes
the existence of emergencies that ‘threaten the life of the
nation.’ [The] International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1966) recognize[s] this kind of emergency.
Anticipating that declarations of emergency might be used
opportunistically by governments as justification for the
unnecessary limitation of rights, human rights law discourages the declaration of an emergency by governments, and
requires the period of emergency to be as short as possible.
Even in emergencies, certain human rights may not be limited,
according to human rights law. These include the right not to
be tortured and the right not to be discriminated against.”50

Consideration of ELSI is further relevant in responding to
criticism of a legalist bias in homeland security: While agreeing on the need for sound legal foundations of homeland
security, some critics maintain that constitutional and legal
considerations sometimes prevail over a pointed analysis of
security gaps and vulnerabilities.51 ELSI analysis can help
put those legal foundations and measures into the broader
context of the society whose values and way of life homeland
security is meant to protect. The purpose of ELSI is not to
construct homeland security but help make it more consistent, stronger, and responsive to the society it seeks to protect.
Security needs to be weighed against other values, such as

liberty and freedom, but also accountability and freedom of
discussion. In this light, critical thinking and continuous discussion and debate about balancing values in homeland security are not signs of weakness, but a natural part of the effort
and ingredients of success.52 Lack of critical thinking in
homeland security not only can lead to self‐serving policies,
but to loss of public trust and to mass casualties.53
Due ELSI consideration is also important to achieve balanced implementation of a whole‐community approach. Often
seen as a policy to push the first line of defense against all‐
hazards threat to the local level and an acknowledgment of the
fact that all disasters are local, the “S” dimension in ELSI also
refers to balancing intelligence needs with public awareness,
public vigilance, and public engagement. Thus, the debate
about domestic intelligence for homeland security needs to
expand its focus beyond discussion of the security–liberty
balance,54 to include needs for some societal ownership and
societally actionable intelligence. Campaigns such as “See
Something, Say Something” and initiatives such as Ready.gov
contribute as much to that objective as does the National
Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) that includes published
bulletins in order to enhance transparency and efficiency in
communicating information about terrorist threats to the
American public, recognizing “that Americans all share
responsibility for the nation’s security, and should always be
aware of the heightened risk of terrorist attack in the United
States and what they should do.”55 At the same time ELSI safeguards are built in. For example, the Nationwide Suspicious
Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI)
“has worked with various advocacy groups, such as the
American Civil Liberties Union, to develop protections that
make up a comprehensive NSI Privacy Protection
Framework. The NSI requires each fusion center to consider
privacy throughout the SAR process by fully adopting this
framework prior to NSI participation. Working with different advocacy groups and stakeholders in states across the
country has served an important role in successfully shaping
and implementing NSI policies and processes.”56

The next two sections will focus on two defining debates
about ELSI aspects in U.S. homeland security: homeland
security legislation (specifically the USA PATRIOT Act
of 2001 and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015) and the
Constitution; and domestic surveillance, with related use of
technology such as “drones,” or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAV) and related data‐processing systems, referred to as
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS).
HOMELAND SECURITY LEGISLATION
AND THE INTENT OF THE CONSTITUTION
Assessment of ethical, legal, and social issues in homeland
security in practice should naturally begin with considering
homeland security legislation within the framework and
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intent of the U.S. Constitution. Consideration of legal aspects
in homeland security in an ELSI context puts legislative
change and judicial review in the context of societal values,
political ethics, and the ethics of democracy. As The NSA
Report: Liberty and Security in a Changing World pointed
out, it is a constitutional principle that the “United States
must protect, at once, two different forms of security:
national security and personal privacy.”57
It is important to remember that the Constitution itself
and some Amendments verbally introduced the concept of
security in what we would today call an ELSI context:58
• As per the Preamble, to “secure the Blessings of liberty
to ourselves and to our Posteriority” is one of the reasons that the People of the United States are establishing the Constitution.
• According to the Second Amendment, together with
Supreme Court ruling, citizens’ right to possess firearms is generally protected, unconnected to any service
in a militia. The text of the Amendment reads: “A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.”
• According to the Fourth Amendment,
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” As noted
by the U.S. Senate, this Amendment seeks to safeguard the
balance between security and liberty by “placing a neutral
magistrate between the police and the citizen.”59

In addition, Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution
provides that
• “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every state in this
union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of
the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic violence.”60
As President of the Constitutional Convention, George
Washington had already explained in 1787 the intent of the
Constitution as it relates to finding the right balance between
security and liberty:
“Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of
liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice
must depend as well on situation and circumstances, as on
the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw
with precision the line between those rights which must be
surrendered, and those which may be reserved; and on the
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present occasion this difficulty was encreased by a difference among the several states as to their situation, extent,
habits, and particular interests.”61

The era of homeland security demonstrates the continued
relevance of Washington’s caveat: that a Constitution itself
cannot set a perennial standard for a republic and democracy
to maintain equilibrium between the two guiding values of
security and liberty. As Washington maintained, a balance
may only be found on a case by case basis, depending on
circumstances and societal objectives.
In this context, critics have maintained that American
elites, to include Supreme Court justices, have historically
tended and continue to tend to invoke or support limitations
to personal freedoms as threat perceptions increase and maintain prevalence of fundamental liberties only again once the
perceived threat declines.62 A major criticism of homeland
security legislation refers to its negative impact on the first
ten Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, also known as the
Bill of Rights. This mainly relates to the rights to freedom of
speech, religion, assembly, and privacy (First Amendment);
to legal counsel and due process, including speedy and public
trial (Fifth and Sixth Amendment); and to the right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures (Fourth
Amendment as cited above).63 The related criticism centers
on USA PATRIOT Act of 2002 and the subsequent USA
FREEDOM Act of 2015, which will be subsequently discussed.
USA PATRIOT Act
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001, known as the USA Patriot Act, was
part of the vastest federal government reorganization effort
since the National Security Act of 1947, which had created,
among other things the Department of Defense and the
Central Intelligence Agency. The USA PATRIOT Act
includes a definition of domestic, as opposed to international,
terrorism.64 It allows authorities new measures in combating
terrorism, including domestic terrorism, mainly by expanding permissible surveillance while reducing judicial supervision, in addition to creating new statuary crimes and giving
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) the right to detain
immigrants suspicious of terrorism. This included tapping of
suspect terrorists’ phones, observation of internet activity,
and secret searches of homes.65
While the PATRIOT Act did not create a new crime of
domestic terrorism, it expanded the type of conduct that the
government can investigate when it is investigating “terrorism.” Although the Congressional intent in diversifying the
elements of terrorism was to provide a legal framework for
arrest, prosecution and jury trial under the Constitution, critics believe the definition of domestic terrorism was too
broad, with too much potential for abuse.66 Further criticism
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of the Act focuses on the following main aspects that bear
significant ELSI relevance:67
• Sneak‐and‐peak searches, “a special search warrant
that allows law enforcement officers to lawfully enter
areas in which a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists, to search for items of evidence or contraband
and leave without making any seizures or giving concurrent notice of the search.”68
• Warrants from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC), which are not required to be released, in
particular to the person under investigation, since they
are not public record.
• National Security Letters (NSLs), which can be issued
by FBI field supervisors without involving judicial
authority. Those letters
“give anti‐terrorism and counter‐intelligence investigators access to an array of consumer information […] [,]
where consumers seldom learn that their records have
been reviewed unless they are prosecuted. Some examples of records accessible to investigators include driver’s
licenses, hotel bills, storage rental agreements, apartment
leases and other commercial records, cash deposits, wire
and digital money transfers, and even patient business
records and personal health information.”69
Sneak‐and‐peak rules were revised in the USA PATRIOT
Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. A delayed
notice requirement was introduced, where suspects must
normally be informed about a previously conducted sneak‐
and‐peek search within a “reasonable period not to exceed
30 days.”70 Further legislation drove organizational changes
to DHS in order to integrate ELSI consideration across the
homeland security mission space. A particularly relevant
organizational change is the creation of the Office for Civil
Rights and Liberties (CRCL) within the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.
Established by DHS based on requirements from the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) is responsible for “integrating civil rights and liberties into all of the
Department activities.”71 This among other things includes
“[c]ommunicating with individuals and communities whose
civil rights and civil liberties may be affected by Department
activities, informing them about policies and avenues of
redress, and promoting appropriate attention within the
Department to their experiences and concerns.”72 CRCL
responsibility extends beyond homeland security investigation issues. It also includes ensuring consideration of ELSI
in homeland security core missions, such as border security,
and their challenge‐driven priorities, such as related to massively increased amounts of unaccompanied alien children

and family units apprehended at the U.S. Southwest border
in 2014:
“CRCL continued to play a role in the Department’s response
to the influx of unaccompanied children through participation
in the Unified Coordination Group, working with other
offices on immigration policy to recognize and respect children’s and families’ civil rights, civil liberties, and access to
processes to claim international protection from return to
their countries of origin. […] The influx of children and
families prompted a substantial increase in complaints
received regarding Border Patrol apprehension, short‐term
detention by Border Patrol, and the detention of families
with children in the new ICE family residential facilities. In
FY 2014, CRCL opened for investigation 87 new complaints
involving children, including opening two complaints concerning family facilities, and closed 12 complaints.”73

As CRCL is responsible for implementing consideration
of ELSI aspects across the activity spectrum of DHS, its
responsibilities include community engagement. CRCL not
only uses community engagement to support local contexts
of due consideration of civil rights and civil liberties in the
application of homeland security activities. CRCL community engagement also helps consistently address risk‐informed
homeland security priories at local level. For example, the
office’s community engagement
“provides opportunities for diverse communities and law
enforcement to build understanding and strong partnerships
that can assist in identifying behaviors, tactics, and other
indicators of potential violent and terrorist activity. Local
communities are the front lines of defense and response, and
are essential in addressing this issue. Local law enforcement
authorities and community members are often best able to
identify individuals or groups exhibiting suspicious or dangerous behaviors – and intervene – before they commit an act
of violence. The Department, through CRCL, builds on
community‐based activities to strengthen resilience in
communities targeted by violent extremist recruitment. Over
the past few years, CRCL has held more than 100 community
engagement events, and has trained over 5,000 state and local
law enforcement and fusion center personnel on cultural
awareness and how to best engage with communities.”74

The legal discussion of National Security Letters has concluded that they are not in violation of the Fourth Amendment:
While FBI issues those letters to telecommunication providers
to obtain information about certain customers, including payment sources, search queries, browsing history, and e‐mail
recipient and subject lines, this is considered information that
the customer already has voluntarily given to a third party, the
service provider, by using its services. Under the “third‐party
doctrine,” first described by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Miller (1976),75 therefore, the National Security
Letters do not constitute searches in the sense of the Fourth
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Amendment because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information possessed or known by third parties.76
Commentators have therefore argued that the letters may
instead violate the First Amendment due to their possible effect
on free speech, where the letters may “chill” people away from
actually exercising that right for fear of prosecution:
“The chilling effect occurs when people become reluctant
to take part in certain activities because they fear participation will bring them under official suspicion of criminal
activity. Chill is problematic when it leads people to opt‐
out of activities that are legitimate and desirable in a free
society, such as free association, free speech, and political
organization.”77

USA FREEDOM Act
Following a lack of Congressional approval, parts of the
Patriot Act expired on June 1, 2015. The Uniting And
Strengthening America By Fulfilling Rights And Ensuring
Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015 (USA
FREEDOM Act)78 renewed some expired provisions from
the PATRIOT Act through 2019, as well as set limits on mass
data collection by the government. Much about the legislative as well as public debate about the USA FREEDOM Act
centered on its expected impact on domestic surveillance,
specifically by NSA. The Act largely restricts domestic surveillance and the use of technology for such surveillance to
the presence of specific requests. Under the PATRIOT Act,
production of domestic surveillance data would often have
been allowable for mere threat assessment. In particular, the
Act responded to concerns about NSA surveillance of U.S.
persons by putting a halt to the agency’s mass phone data
collection program. NSA now requires a federal court permission to receive information about targeted individuals.
The Act also establishes limitations on use of Section 215
of the USA PATRIOT Act, the particular section emblazing
the Snowden debate. According to Section 215, the government may apply for a court order compelling any person or
entity to turn over records of data relevant to a foreign intelligence investigation. In 2013, Edward Snowden leaked information about the use of Section 215 to bulk collect telephone
metadata that NSA held and that could be queried by foreign
intelligence investigators.79 Under the USA FREEDOM Act,
use of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act is limited to
government data collection based on a “specific selection
term” (SST), defined as “a term that specifically identifies a
person, account, address, or personal device, or any other specific identifier.”80 This puts strong constraints on bulk data collection, along with further provisions that include
“minimization requirements on the use of [technology] for
conducting surveillance by prohibiting the retention or dissemination of information collected not pertaining to a target
of the search; for example, the NSA must enact procedures
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to discard any dragnet information collected not correlated
to targeted and approved searches.”81

In addition, the USA FREEDOM Act prohibits searches
targeting U.S. persons without emergency authorization.82
Also, the Act takes steps to increase the transparency of
surveillance. For example, it allows telecommunication
companies to disclose estimates of orders, compliance,
and accounts affected, and it requires annual publication
of how many orders were sought and granted, and how
many U.S. persons were targeted.83 Lastly, the USA
FREEDOM Act requires the government to periodically
report, and authorizes the private sector to periodically
disclose, aggregate statistics of the use of the authorities
granted by the Act.84
While these are examples of responsive legislation to
address ELSI concerns, questions and unease remain with the
critics of homeland security legislation. An important critical
ELSI consideration is if concerns about privacy (data collection) can be sufficiently addressed by transparency (ex post
reporting of accumulated information about data collection).85
Wrong conceptions of ELSI may tempt leaders and
organizations in the public sector to seek a false balance
between risk‐informed homeland security capabilities and
response to public concerns, such facilitating outcomes that
do not serve society and increase organizational gaps in
homeland security. For example,
“[i]n response to the public outcry following the leaks,
Congress enacted several provisions restricting intelligence
programs. The president unilaterally imposed several more
restrictions. Many of these may protect privacy. Some of
them, if considered in isolation, might not seem a major
imposition on intelligence gathering. But in fact none of
them operate in isolation. Layering all of these restrictions
on top of the myriad existing rules will at some point create
an encrusted intelligence bureaucracy that is too slow, too
cautious, and less effective.”86

Consideration of “long‐term consequences of legal changes
made to address short‐term public opinion”87 should therefore be a common element in any ELSI approach because
over‐response to public concerns of the day may harm the
societal security posture in the longer term.
DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE AND HOMELAND
SECURITY TECHNOLOGY SUCH AS UNMANNED
AERIAL SYSTEMS
Domestic surveillance and use of homeland security technology is a defining debate not only because of its relevance
in public discourse but also because it cuts across homeland
security missions and national preparedness capabilities.
ELSI concerns arise with both the inclusion and exclusion of
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humans in the process of applying security technologies,
with the solution only lying in a dilemma:88 Leaving the
human in the loop creates room for errors, use of bias, and
erroneously or intentionally unfair treatment of other
humans. Taking the human out of the loop is against fundamental ethical and common legal requirements. It also may
make procedures more ELSI compliant but infringe the goal
of delivering security to society as a common good.
Human‐operated and implemented security technologies
give rise to concerns such as the following:
“Humans are psychologically and cognitively imperfect in a
range of ways that affect the effectiveness of technologies
and the fairness of their application. For example, studies
have shown that humans can pay attention to events on a
CCTV monitor for no more than about 20 minutes, after
which their ability to spot real‐time security threats effectively dives dramatically.”89

At the same time, significant concerns relate to automated
technological solutions for homeland security:
“Automation brings its own set of ethical and legal
risks. Accountability for actions is a particular concern.
Accountability requires that decisions that have an impact
on individuals’ rights and freedoms should be traceable to an
individual or a body of people authorized to make that decision and who can be held responsible. It also requires that
the effectiveness and proportionality of an action should be
verifiable after the fact. A data mining technology that uses
extremely complicated algorithms to analyze huge quantities of information from a variety of sources to determine
who should be singled out for surveillance may raise issues
of accountability if no single individual is able to verify the
reliability of that determination. In addition, sometimes
technology may be insufficiently sensitive to morally significant distinctions to deploy force proportionately.”90

National Security Agency
Due consideration of the societal dimension of homeland
security is important in addressing a series of criticisms of
homeland security that in particular relate to surveillance
and information collection on U.S. persons. Balancing security with other values is not only a legal requirement and a
policy expectation, it also is a social fact that homeland security policy must consider in addition to mission requirements. Homeland security that is not perceived legitimate
and proportional to both risk and freedoms is unable to pursue the whole of community approach in which it is
grounded. Public concerns about the REAL ID Act about
consistent, difficult to tamper standards for State identity
cards and some domestic information collected by the
National Security Agency (NSA) are cases in point. Although
new social media networks like Facebook and search engines
such as Google, and others, collect much more information

with no requirements, standards, or restrictions, the activity
of governmental agencies created much more tension and
suspicion.
Public debate and emergence of ELSI issues regarding
domestic surveillance in the public mind when, following
leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, several
tabloids published top secret court orders and surveillance
programs, including an order to Verizon to hand over all their
customers’ calling records to the NSA.91 National Security
Letters as discussed above in the context of the USA PATRIOT
Act came to be widely discussed in the press and the public.
ELSI aspects involved include the question of whether telecommunication company customers were actually regarded
as citizens by the government or merely as data subjects.
Businesses got under pressure to publicly disclose the character of secret government requests, their frequency, and the
frequency of compliance with those requests. Prohibited by
the government to make this disclosure at what they deemed
appropriate detail, companies filed lawsuits to be allowed
full disclosure.92
The so‐called NSA Report, mandated by President Obama
as a response to the Snowden case, provides an insightful
analysis of ELSI related to intelligence in the homeland security era, calling for fostering of a democratic security culture,
based on the following two principles, among others:
“Protecting the Right to Privacy. The right to privacy is
essential to a free and self‐governing society. The rise of
modern technologies makes it all the more important that
democratic nations respect peoples’ fundamental right to
privacy, which is a defining part of individual security and
personal liberty.
Protecting Democracy, Civil Liberties, and the Rule of
Law. Free debate within the United States is essential to the
long‐term vitality of American democracy and helps bolster
democracy globally. Excessive surveillance and unjustified
secrecy can threaten civil liberties, public trust, and the core
processes of democratic self‐government. All parts of the
government, including those that protect our national
security, must be subject to the rule of law.”93

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
“Drones” are a pertinent example to explore technology‐
related ELSI further and relate them to the tangible example
of surveillance. The increase in surveillance technologies
has evoked several debates between supporters and opponents in a variety of fields,94 including the use of unmanned
aerial vehicles, or UAV, commonly known as “drones.” We
should specifically speak about unmanned aerial systems, or
UAS, since ELSI aspects here relate to big data – sourcing
and processing of information from interconnected systems –
and about payloads (detection, surveillance, and other possible technology) carried. ELSI considerations thus extend
beyond the vehicle, or “drone,” as such.95 Homeland security
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uses of drones include critical infrastructure designation,
such as in the context of big events, supporting mainstreaming of situational awareness, and common situational picture‐generating processes across jurisdictions and agencies.
For example, UAS are useful in mapping out the surroundings of a stadium to help law enforcement determine critical
infrastructure and protection needs in the area. UAS are
dual‐use technologies, usable for both civil and military‐
sector deployment.
This raises ELSI questions such as use of weaponized
drones in border management or domestic counterterrorism.
In a 2013 poll, 62% of the respondents supported “the use of
drones to control illegal immigration on the nation’s border.”
However, only 44% were in favor of “allowing law enforcement to use drones armed with weapons to patrol the nation’s
border,” which shows that the public differentiates between
uses of the same technology in different mission scenarios.96
ELSI‐related criticism of UAS as a homeland security
capability has focused on surveillance and in particular of
privacy rights and the Fourth Amendment, regarding big
data potentially collected on U.S. persons by proliferating
UAS technology.97 U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) were criticized for flying operations for, or lending
drones to, other agencies, thus potentially bypassing legal
restrictions on their use, while acknowledging the contribution of this capability to enhance disaster response and effectuate emergency management, as well as to secure U.S.
borders.98 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 allowed the DHS Secretary to start a pilot program to examine the “[u]se of advanced technological systems, including sensors, video, and unmanned aerial
vehicles, for border surveillance.”99 This however raised
issues of surveillance and mass data collection. A proposed
solution to these issues is the integration of the homeland
security use of UAS into the broader “System Wide
Information Management,” or SWIM, concept for next generation air traffic management.100
Integration of homeland security use of UAS into SWIM
could help address ELSI aspects such as classification of
data security levels; validation of data against authoritative
sources; crowd monitoring; collection and use of data from a
variety of sources;101 and public risk posed by UAS, that
were also addressed in the context of the FAA Modernization
and Reform Act of 2012.102 Also, a security by design
approach has been called for to mitigate risk of abuse, so that
technology development would integrate anti‐tamper measures into dual‐use and military systems that reduce risk of
adversaries gaining information, or even terrorist hijacking
(by hacking) of drones and their use in domestic attacks.103
The legal response to use of surveillance technology is
evolving along with the technological capabilities and their
critics.104 The Supreme Court decided that law enforcement
permits the use of surveillance technology via a private plane
in “public navigable airspace,” including over enclosed
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backyards, and that this did not pose a Fourth Amendment
violation.105 When more sophisticated tracking technology is
used, the Supreme Court sees this as a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment, thus requiring a legal warrant.106
However, the Supreme Court ruled, routine surveillance and
searches conducted at the border do not require a warrant or
probable cause.107
As of now, 31 States have put UAS‐related legislation in
place, and a total of 41 states have considered UAS‐related
legal action in the 2016 legislative session.108 Whereas the
majority of legal provisions at State levels seem to relate to
protection of critical infrastructure from aerial exploration
by adversaries and to weaponized drones, ELSI‐related regulations do exist and typically include public safety and
force protection, as well as sometimes general limitations on
surveillance‐related drone use.109
For example, Louisiana State legislation addresses safety
hazards posed by privately operated unmanned aerial systems: “If the flight of a UAS into the cordoned area endangers the public or an officer’s safety, law enforcement
personnel or fire department personnel are authorized to disable the UAS.”110 Except as provided in an enumeration of
admissible uses in its privacy protection act, the State of
Vermont prevents law enforcement agencies for example
from using “a drone or information acquired through the use
of a drone for the purpose of investigating, detecting, or prosecuting crime,” or from use of drones “to gather or retain data
on private citizens peacefully exercising their constitutional
rights of free speech and assembly.”111 However, law enforcement may use drones “for observational, public safety purposes that do not involve gathering or retaining data, or in
cases where a legal warrant was obtained.”112 Nevertheless,
“[f]acial recognition or any other biometric matching technology shall not be used on any data that a drone collects on
any person, home, or area other than the target of the surveillance.”113 Similarly, as another example, Maine requires a
warrant to use of UAS by law enforcement, except in special
circumstances.114 Those among others include situations that
threaten national, state, or local security, or the “life or safety
of one or more individuals.”115 Noteworthy, in Maine’s legislation, ethical aspects – saving human life – are an exception
to the restriction of UAS based on other ELSI consideration,
mostly as it relates to legal aspects.
ELSI ACROSS THE HOMELAND
SECURITY CYCLE
Pulling examples from the all‐hazards spectrum, this section
summarizes ELSI across the sectors of the homeland security cycle as defined in the National Preparedness Goal,
based on Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD‐8) “National
Preparedness” (2011): “A secure and resilient Nation with
the capabilities required across the whole community to
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prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover
from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”116
ELSI consideration can help reach the goal of a resilient
nation, by enhancing individual and community preparedness: Providing different members of society with information and resources not only meet ethical, legal, and social
requirements for whole‐community homeland security. It
also enables different members of society to contribute their
share to building a resilient nation:
“Whole community contributors include children; older
adults; individuals with disabilities and others with access
and functional needs; those from religious, racial, and ethnically diverse backgrounds; people with limited English
proficiency; and owners of animals including household pets
and service animals. Their needs and contributions must be
integrated into our efforts. Each community contributes to
the [National Preparedness] Goal by individually preparing
for the risks that are most relevant and urgent for them individually. By empowering individuals and communities with
knowledge and skills they can contribute to achieving the
National Preparedness Goal.”117

Prevention
The prevention mission of the National Preparedness Goal is
centered on the funding core mission of the homeland security enterprise: “preventing, avoiding, or stopping a threatened or an actual act of terrorism.”118 Airport security is the
best example to illustrate prevention‐related ELSI. Ethical
and legal issues of airport security have been discussed since
long before 9/11, and the arguments remain relevant.119
Airport security screening might involve unconstitutional
searches, out of a reasonable balance between law enforcement and privacy rights and interests. According to the
Fourth Amendment, the American people have the right “to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” This results in the
requirement for any search that takes place to be made on
reasonable grounds, with reasonableness commonly defined
by the courts based on “the degree of intrusiveness of the
search procedure; the magnitude and frequency of the threat;
and the sufficiency of alternatives to conducting a search.”120
In addition, courts “consider the effectiveness of the search
in reducing the threat and whether sufficient care has been
taken to limit the scope of the search as much as possible,
while still maintaining this effectiveness.”121 Today’s new
technologies, including full body scanners, add a new dimension to such an assessment, since the technological potential
for intrusive search is there to reveal items that may be illegal but do not pose a threat to aviation security, thus arguably
bouncing the reasonability of the screening, or search.
Related cases were already treated in courts before the body
scanner age, where criminal defendants sought to exclude evidence such as drugs found during airport security screening by

arguing detection of those items was the result of an illegal
search, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.122 In rejection, it
was maintained that airport searches as such qualify as private
conduct. Counterarguments often referred to the administrative
search exception, according to which administrative searches
are permissible on the basis of societal purposes other than
criminal law enforcement that they help achieve, to explicitly
include safety of traffic in general.123
Already in 1976, the Supreme Court explained in United
States v. Martinez‐Fuerte that expectations in privacy and
freedom “are significantly different,” when one moves in the
public space, “from the traditional expectation of privacy and
freedom in one’s residence.”124 While it would probably be
hard to maintain that airport security screenings after 9/11 can
be considered private conduct since they are performed by the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which is a
component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,125
courts have used the administrative search argument in their
ruling, for example regarding Fourth‐Amendment violation
arguments related to full‐body scanning machines.126 At the
same time, unmet need to inform the public ahead of time
about the introduction of the machines as well as missing
large public consultation were pointed out.127
Airport security as well exemplifies social issues in the
protection mission, such as public acceptance irrespective of
legal acceptability of a measure. If homeland security is
about commonly acquired values and a way of life, as per the
homeland security vision of the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review, then public acceptance of security measures and supporting technologies is as important as legal and
ethical acceptability. In the final analysis, the effectiveness
of security procedures depends on the acceptance of all people involved, and thus is a societal as well as a human factors
issue. It relates to TSA personnel performing screening and
using technology, as well as to travelers, airline crews, and
family and friends watching their loved ones going through
the procedure. It also is a cultural issue since air travel security virtually covers the citizens of the world, with all their
diverse ethnic, faith, and cultural backgrounds.
Public acceptance of security technologies was studied
extensively before 9/11, with one focus on air travel. Main
variables found in previous analyses to explain public
acceptance, or lack thereof, include, among others, the character of the threat, the degree of its understanding, and the
perception of the associated risk; the understanding of the
screening process and its objectives; personality factors; as
well as convenience factors such as the effect of the security
technology and procedures on reducing time delays.128
Protection
The protection mission of the National Preparedness Goal
focuses on “protecting our citizens, residents, visitors,
assets, systems, and networks against the greatest threats and
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hazards in a manner that allows our interests, aspirations,
and way of life to thrive.”129 The main ELSI consideration of
the protection mission was already framed by John Jay in the
Federalist No. 2: “To all general purposes we have uniformly
been one people each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection.”130
However, homeland security measures can inadvertently
end up in making secure or wealthy citizens more secure,
and vulnerable or less prosperous citizens more vulnerable
in their use of critical infrastructure. For example, in their
analysis of the Pan Am Flight 103 (Lockerbie) case of 1988,
the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and
Terrorism had already concluded that “[p]ublic notification
of threats to civil aviation should be made under certain circumstances. As a rule, however, such notification must be
universal, to avoid any appearance of favored treatment of
certain individuals or groups.”131 This is still true today:
Homeland security policies, strategies, and capabilities must
not, by design, create or reinforce uneven distribution of protection from threats and hazards, or, by design, limit civil
liberties while seeking to provide for civil security.
Current U.S. critical infrastructure protection policy is a
good example of built‐in ELSI safeguards against the risk of
such wrong trading of values. It rests on Presidential Policy
Directive – PPD‐21 “Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience” and Executive Order 13636, both of 2013,
directing federal departments and agencies to collaborate
among each other and with the private sector to increase the
security and resilience of national critical infrastructure. The
Executive Order requires involved departments and agencies
to assess the privacy and civil liberties impacts of the activities, and the results are addressed in published assessment
reports with concrete recommendations for improvement.132
Another pertinent example is crime prevention through
environmental design. This is a traditional concept that has
also been used in homeland security. Hardening of soft targets by making urban built infrastructure a “defensible
space”133 becomes more and more important as we look at for
example resilience enhancing programs in response to lone
wolf attacks such as the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013
or the increase in active shooter incidents, culminating in the
Orlando Night Club shooting in 2016 that was defined as the
worst terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11.134 The
relevant case record transcends the United State to include
incidents such as the Paris shootings in 2015, as well as the
Brussels bombings and the Istanbul Airport bombing in 2016.
Since those attacks typically occur in metropolitan settings to ensure maximum attention for the terrorists’ “message,” resilience enhancement here directly relates to
combining societal and infrastructure dimensions of preparedness, as also pointed out in the 2016 National Preparedness
Report,135 to create a system that combines social and built
environment and infrastructure in order to increase both
societal and infrastructural resilience by reducing potential
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vulnerabilities and impacts and supporting effective crisis
management.
However, the “securitization of urban design”136 has been
criticized from an ELSI perspective. In The Culture of
Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society,
cultural criminologist David Garland identifies cultural and
institutional practices to construct artefacts that allow a continuation of imagined middle‐class separation from crime.
Garland illustrates his argument with examples from urban
planning, especially the concept of offering citizens new
middle‐class type privacy in private public spaces, such as
commercial malls based on architectures “to separate out
different ‘types’ of people,” including commercial policing
by private companies.137 This does not only put other parts of
the urban population at higher security risk but may further
undermine a whole‐community approach by encouraging
territorial thinking on the side of those parts of the population that are privileged to inhabit the securitized urban
infrastructure.
Mitigation
The mitigation mission of the National Preparedness Goal
relates to “mitigating the loss of life and property by lessening the impact of future disasters.”138 Cybersecurity is
another good example of ELSI related to mitigation, since
recent legislation and strategy have focused on sharing of
threat indicators and building of whole‐community awareness to constrain the impact of malicious cyber incidents and
cyber attacks.
The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015
(CISA) aims to improve cybersecurity in the United States
through enhanced sharing of information about cybersecurity threats.139 It is controversial as critics see it as an unbalanced move of responsibility to government, thereby
increasing security risks to personal private information that
following the Act might be scattered across a number of
agencies across tiers of government, from NSA to local law
enforcement.140 A main point of criticism is that the sharing
procedure is ill‐defined and raises a series of ELSI concerns.
While the Act is supposed to facilitate companies’ sharing of
personal information with governmental agencies in particular in cases of cyber threats, federal agencies’ receipt of
threat information may infringe privacy of not correctly earmarked as irrelevant to cyber security and appropriately
removed during the sharing process, with a potential to result
in “unfiltered oversharing.”141
Critics such as the American Civil Liberties Union argued
the Act would only increase surveillance while not actual
security (adding little to prevent cyber attacks while limiting
companies’ liability in lawsuits over data that were shared
unnecessarily and allow identification of individuals), thus
harming the security–liberty balance.142 Noteworthy, DHS
itself had raised concerns about the bill. The Department
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criticized the plans for direct sharing of information with
government agencies. It argued that it should be given the
role of the sole recipient of information from the private sector, conduct privacy impact assessments, and erase irrelevant
personal information from the cyber threat indicators that
arrive from the private sector.143
Given the private ownership of the vast majority of critical infrastructure, the relevance of the debate of security vs.
other democratic open‐society values does not end at all at
the limits of the public sector. Balancing values right in the
homeland security enterprise is an issue that no single traditional business code of ethics if going to resolve. Business
ethics considerations from the discipline of security management are highly relevant to ELSI in homeland security as
they relate to use of classified information, procurement, and
accountability.
First, “[t]here is no conflict between pursuit of profit and
attention to ethics. Businesses generally will prosper in an
environment that is fair, open, and morally secure.”144 Second,
the citizens themselves are the first line of defense in cybersecurity, as the Cybersecurity National Action Plan (2016)
acknowledges.145 Third, the next line of defense then are
employees in the private sector who are united in a robust security culture and harden the private sector’s social defense posture against cyber attacks and privacy infringements in general:
“Employees are the key to ethical business conduct, and their
behavior is strongly influenced by the way they are treated and
how they view management. Ethics flourish in an environment
that fosters individual self‐respect, loyalty, and dedication.”146
As can be seen here again, consequential, duty, and value
ethics need to be present together in homeland security.
Response
The response mission of the National Preparedness Goal is
“focused on ensuring that the Nation is able to effectively
respond to any threat or hazard, including those with cascading effects, with an emphasis on saving and sustaining lives
and stabilizing the incident, as well as rapidly meeting basic
human needs, restoring basic services and community functionality, establishing a safe and secure environment, and
supporting the transition to recovery.”147

Emergency management ethics are a major example of
related ELSI, in particular addressing decision dilemmas in
allocating scare resources to different groups of members of
society in times of crisis. Yet the challenges go even further,
as can be seen in the public health response to infectious
diseases:
“[B]ecause disease‐control measures sometimes involve
infringement of widely accepted individual rights and liberties, infectious diseases raise difficult ethical questions about

how to strike a balance between the goal of protecting the
greater good of public health and the goal of protecting
human rights. Quarantine, isolation and travel restrictions,
for example, violate the right to freedom of movement.
Other public health measures—such as contact tracing, the
notification of thirds parties, and the reporting of health status of individuals to authorities – can interfere with the right
to privacy. Although measures such as these may sometimes
be necessary to avert public health disasters, the following
question arises: How great must a public health threat be for
such measures to be justified? […] While ethicists have to
date focused on the possibility of conflict between the promotion of public health and individual rights, diseases which
are said to have security implications additionally pose conflict between the protection of security and individual rights.
Measures like quarantine, for example, might sometimes be
motivated by the goal to promote national security (in addition to public health).”148

Large‐scale public health disasters caused by a communicable disease
“confront governments and public health organizations with
ethical issues that would have wide‐ranging implications
and consequences. Public officials and health care professionals would face difficult ethical dilemmas in trying to
choose among potentially conflicting priorities, particularly
if no ethical guidelines are developed in advance. […] [T]
here would not be enough time to engage in a public discussion of the ethical trade‐offs in many of the critical decisions
that would need to be made.”149 “[T]he entire country would
face simultaneous limitations, resulting in severe shortages
of critical care resources to the point where patients could no
longer receive all of the care that would usually be required
and expected. […] [A] severe pandemic will challenge
almost every sector of society – the health care sector, the
labor force, banking, and law enforcement, to name a few.”150

Critical ethical issues include “health workers’ duty to
provide care during a communicable disease outbreak’” thus
exposing themselves at high risk; “allocation of scarce
resources; and conceivable restrictions on individual autonomy and liberty in the interest of public health through public health management measures such as quarantine and
border closures.”151 Important ethical principles to address
resulting homeland security decision‐making dilemmas in
an all‐hazards, whole community approach include proportionality, reciprocity, and equity. They should be built into
any preparedness and response plans, not restricted to public
health emergencies, where they may become particularly
obvious.
The principle of proportionality demands that “[r]estrictions to individual liberty, or other measures taken to protect
the public from harm, should not exceed what is necessary to
address the actual level of risk to or critical needs of the
community.”152 The principle of reciprocity “requires that
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society supports those who face a disproportionate burden in
protecting the public and take steps to minimize this burden
as much as possible.”153 “Values of distributive justice and
equity state that all people have equal moral worth;” however, in case of pandemic, “[d]ifficult decisions will have to
be made about whom to treat and about which health care
services to provide and which to defer.”154 Those decisions
“should not be based on an individual’s race, color, religion,
nationality, gender, age, disability, sexual orientation, geography, economic status, or insurance status, unless there are
specific clinical reasons why different groups should be
treated differently.”155
Recovery
According to the National Preparedness Goal,
“[r]ecovery includes those capabilities necessary to assist
communities affected by an incident in recovering effectively. It is focused on a timely restoration, strengthening,
and revitalization of the infrastructure; housing; a sustainable economy; and the health, social, cultural, historic, and
environmental fabric of communities affected by a catastrophic incident.”156

The National Disaster Recovery Framework points out
the objective of revitalizing the social fabric of the community and building a more resilient nation. This requires
assuring
“that recovery activities respect the civil rights and civil liberties of all populations and do not result in discrimination
based on race, color, ethnicity, national origin (including
limited English proficiency), religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, or disability.”157

Not only are all disasters local but also does recovery
already start during the response phase, where decisions are
made about enabling society to attaining a new normal.
Consequently, while the National Disaster Recovery
Framework does not address immediate crisis response, it
emphasizes that “these activities influence recovery activities, necessitating the need for a structure to consider and
advise on recovery implications during the early phases of
incident management.”158 In this context, the framework
points out the relevance of due ELSI consideration:
“Sensitivity and respect for social and cultural diversity must
be maintained at all times. Compliance with equal opportunity and civil rights laws must also be upheld.”159
The moral aspects of the aftermath of natural disasters are
specifically discussed in Ethics for Disaster, by Naomi
Zack.160 She explores how those disasters shed light on societal inequality, arguing for the preservation of normal moral
principles in times of crisis and national emergency. Using
the social contract model that assumes government is only
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legitimate as a function of popular sovereignty, Zack strongly
opposes lifeboat ethics as well as demonstrates the limits of
the liberal democratic paradigm that lays fundamental priority on the protection of individual rights and liberties. While
it may be argued that a lot of the ELSI discussion on surveillance centers on a simple version of the liberal democratic
paradigm where existing citizen rights are to be preserved,
identifying and addressing ELSI in complex crises and disasters arguably requires taking a step beyond. The social contract paradigm extends the scope of emergency management
ethics to include not only protection of assets but also allocation of scarce resources under pressure and uncertainty, while
preserving existing moral principles. Cultural differences
pose an additional challenge to the principle of preserving
universal ethics in disaster response and recovery.
Hurricane Katrina that struck the greater New Orleans
area in 2005 was used to argue that homeland security back
then (before the concept of the homeland security enterprise
and the whole‐community approach were introduced, and
the all‐hazards approach was still to be further elaborated
on) would not have withstood any ELSI test. It was argued
that homeland security’s over‐concern with big terrorism
had undermined the government’s ability to respond to the
rest of the all‐hazards spectrum, failing to deliver security as
a public good to the citizens and failing to respond to most
elemental societal and human needs in disaster.161 The consequence, it was pointed out, was a highly unbalanced allocation of resources for recovery across different parts of the
community struck by the disaster. The whole‐community
approach was introduced by FEMA largely as a response to
such criticism.162
The whole‐community approach is an important foundation for due consideration of ELSI in disaster response and
recovery. It aligns different tracks of homeland security ethics. As Naomi Zack has argued, all three moral systems,
introduced above, that homeland security ethics entail (consequentialism, duty ethics, and virtue ethics) are relevant to
disaster prevention and response, and they also constitute the
ethical space in which recovery takes place:
“Virtue ethics, duty ethics, and consequentialism are all relevant to disaster prevention and response. There are always
individuals who perform virtuous acts in disasters, that is,
heroes. People have duties in disasters; for example, parents
must save their children. The consequences to human well‐
being are primary factors in deciding what to do in
disasters.”163

In today’s complex homeland security environment,
responding to disasters and fighting the war on terrorism,
many organizations from different disciplines and geographic
areas will find themselves working together and transcending
traditional boundaries of all types. While some of them may
have excellent ethics programs, this does little for those who
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do not. An overarching, national homeland security ethic
needs to balance liberty and security in the face of an all‐
hazards threat environment. ELSI in disaster response and
recovery include different organizational and professional
security cultures involved in the endeavor. This not only
relates to interoperability of minds among actors in the
homeland security enterprise, where military, law‐enforcement,
and other models for emergency response and support follow
different principles, such as use of hierarchical authority to
resolve chaos vs. problem‐solving capacity that supports
victims’ capacity to reach a new normal.164
In an ELSI context, for example discussion use of military capabilities in ensuring resilience to disasters would not
concentrate on legal foundations such as the Posse Comitatus
Act or on the provisions for defense support of civil authorities,165 but rather on organizational aspects and security cultures. This would include attention to victims’ perception of
disaster response and recovery intervention by different
organizations, including the military. Events during and following Hurricane Katrina exemplify what victims perceived
as unethical behavior by homeland security professionals at
that time. For instance, “[t]he conditions at the Convention
Center, the Superdome, the I‐10/Causeway Overleaf resembled concentration camps – days of internment without adequate food, water or sanitation, and a growing sense of
hopelessness.”166
An example of how ELSI highlighted by the Katrina disaster were addressed for the future is the Post‐Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006.167 Among
other things, it amended the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (that authorizes Federal assistance when the President declares a State to
be a disaster area). The Stafford Act prohibits discrimination
during disaster relief operations. This now includes race,
color, religion, nationality, sex, age, disability, English proficiency, and economic status in the discrimination protection
clause. State emergency plans must address the needs of all
populations.
While all actors across the homeland security enterprise
need to be able to adopt or switch to action repertories
informed by the values, norms, and rules of civil security,
they also need to bring cultural awareness to the scene: Since
recovery starts in the response phase, homeland security and
emergency response capabilities need to be used in a way
that is enabling societies to return to a new normal, and the
communities struck by disaster need to perceive the use of
those capabilities to be geared to that end. For that to happen, recovery efforts must limit “situational altruism,”
although much valued in commonsense ethics, to the benefit
of limiting the embedding of response and recovery into
mainstream cultural assumptions, where “the practices of
crisis relevant organizations reflect prevailing social hierarchies and the differential value placed on different groups,
subcultures, and lifestyles.”168

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
Due to their universal character, any understanding of ELSI
remains incomplete without addressing them in their international perspective, as the homeland security enterprise
includes working with international partners. It is important
to appreciate how ELSI are understood and addressed elsewhere in the world, considering that “the homeland security
mission is […] a global one, and a homeland security
approach that ends at a nation’s borders is not a homeland
security approach at all.”169 The discussion in this section
will focus on some select examples that bear relevance to
major homeland security debates and activities in the United
States.
ELSI are extensively discussed in the European Union
(EU), as all Member States citizens also are citizens of the
EU, and the European Union’s aims enshrined in the Treaty
on European Union include to “offer its citizens an area of
freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in
which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and
combating of crime,”170 while “maintaining law and order
and safeguarding national security” falls within the responsibility of each Member State.171
The European Agenda on Security of 2015 seeks to
achieve “an EU area of internal security where individuals
are protected in full compliance with fundamental rights.”172
The Agenda is a “shared agenda between the Union and
Member States” but does not pursue a whole‐community or
all‐hazards approach but “prioritises terrorism, organised
crime and cybercrime as interlinked areas with a strong
cross‐border dimension, where EU action can make a real
difference.”173 The Agenda expands on the European
Union’s security model that focuses on ameliorating societal conditions that are seen as the root causes for extremism and terrorism. Based on this model the EU aims at
delivering security along with freedom and justice to its
citizens, among other things strongly focusing on privacy
and data protection rights.
While the EU civil security model differs in some regard
from the U.S. homeland security approach, concrete ELSI
concerns are similar. The emphasis lies on privacy and data
protection, as well as “designing in” of privacy into technological solutions, meaning taking hardware measures in
addition to legal mechanisms to limit potential for excessive
use or abuse.174 This in particular includes the use of “drones”
in internal security (or home affairs, the EU corresponding
term for homeland security).175
ELSI also are prominently addressed in EU counterterrorism. The European Community, the precursor of what
today is known as the European Union that was created in
1992 with the Maastricht Treaty, started to cooperate on
counterterrorism with the creation of the Terrorism,
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Radicalism, Extremism, and International Violence
group, known as the TREVI group, in 1975. This cooperation was framed as law enforcement cooperation, with
terrorism defined as a crime in the first place. After 9/11
and terrorist attacks in the EU, this tradition was expanded
on in the Hague Programme of 2004,176 which among
other things called for ensuring coherence between the
EU and the international legal order, in particular protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in countering
terrorism, fighting organized crime, and security managing migration flows. In the EU discussion, potential for
cooperation between the European Union and the United
States in counterterrorism is sometimes seen as limited
for ELSI reasons: It is argued that the U.S. regard terrorism as an existential threat and use a full‐spectrum
response that raises human rights concerns, whereas the
EU prioritizes policing measures.177
While typically a reason for ethical and legal concerns,
the introduction of biometric identifiers, including biometric
passports for all of its citizens, was framed in the EU mainly
as a protective measure for individual identities, which facilitated political and public acceptance.178 Critics though have
argued that biometrics are a disproportional measure and
basically turn each citizen into a suspect, that biometric data
control is flawed, and that data exchange with the U.S. covering all individuals simply crossing borders goes beyond
the applicable legal basis.179 A more intensive debate was
though triggered by ethnic profiling:
“Ethnic profiling involves the use of ethnic traits (typically
by police, but also potentially by emergency services) as an
indicator of the need for further investigation. Ethnic profiling is controversial because it has been used in ways that
associate certain ethnic groups with certain kinds of criminality. For example, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks of
2001, the German government adopted a program of data
mining of government and social services records to identify
male students of Muslim background. The German Federal
Court later outlawed the policy, citing the stigmatization of
Muslims as one of the reasons against it. Ethnic profiling can
encourage people to perceive certain groups as ill‐intentioned and dangerous and can lead to discrimination against
them.”180

Extensive public debate associated with anti‐terror legislation and investigative practice is not uncommon around the
world. A recent example is a day‐long filibuster (non‐stop
speeches) of the opposition on South Korea’s parliament, to
block a vote on a proposed law supported by the government
that opposition sees as threatening privacy and personal freedoms.181 The bill gives more power to the National
Intelligence Service (NIS) to investigate individual citizens
as well as organizations, without increasing control mechanisms, based on the argument that threats to national security
posed by both North Korea and international terrorism
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require more intelligence. Former NIS directors were under
investigation or even sentenced for overseeing cell phone
conversation monitoring of around 1,800 members of South
Korea’s political, business, and media elite, and for illicitly
using NIS capabilities to support political campaigning.
The filibuster could not prevent passing of the law that
had actually been in the making and in motion multiple
time since the 9/11 terror attacks of 2001.182 The law also
adds new regulations for criminal prosecution, letting
those who form a “terror organization” face capital punishment. Critics argue that the new NIS powers are disproportional and unbalanced, although the agency has now
been put into a reporting line to the Prime Minister and
been given a high‐level committee that will define the policies that the agency is going to execute. However, critics
maintain that the definition of terrorism in the new law is
dangerously unspecific and open to abuse. The law defines
terrorism as an “act that can put national security and citizens’ safety at risk which includes the disturbance of the
nation, regional government, and foreign government
exercising its authority.”183
In the case of Israel, the unique situation of the country
warrants a critical approach to political discourse about
security vs. liberty. Public discourse has portrayed the
country as both vulnerable and in an eternal survival
struggle against enduring enemies.184 From this resulted
the self‐help argument, legitimizing military action for
homeland security and defense, as well as emergency
measures. Long before the era of homeland security, in
1953, Israel’s High Court of Justice established that freedom (specifically, of expression) was not absolute but
relative to other interests of a democratic society.185 The
Court assumed a hierarchy of democratic values where
security was positioned above freedom of speech and
other liberties, at the same time adding that invoking this
hierarchy was only appropriate when the risk of damage
(of free speech) to “public peace” was high, thus in the
end overruling a government decision to suspend two
communist newspapers.186
Another example is immigration legislation that has
been criticized for preventing family unification and therefore being unethical. The Citizenship and Entry into Israel
Law, created in 2003 by temporary order in response to the
increase in suicide attacks during the second intifada was
prolonged with its scope expanded several times so that it
came to prevent anybody from immigrating who comes
from any region where a threat to the security of the state
of Israel may originate.187 An ELSI concern arising is
unproportionality, that is, subjecting a lot of different
groups of people to general restrictions without using risk
assessment to scale homeland security measures to actual
threat levels. Proponents argue with reference to the countries’ eternal state of emergency, where the right of Israeli
citizens to live is more important than the right of families
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to be unified.188 An eternal state of emergency again is a
concept that critics of securitization would reject on ELSI
grounds. However, as discussed, ELSI categories, while as
such universal, cannot be used adequately without an
understanding of security cultures.
HOW TO ADDRESS ELSI IN EVERYDAY
HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. homeland security being an enterprise that not only
transcends DHS but government and the public sector, society is an active partner in the creation and delivery of security as a common good, as opposed to just a recipient of that
good. The homeland security community’s efforts to safeguard commonly acquired values should itself be guided by
those values, and not acquire a potential to infringe them.
Those aspects are part of a challenge that relates to ethical,
legal, and social issues, or ELSI. It warrants critical thinking
rooted in cross‐disciplinary and global perspectives.
The discussion as such is now new, and neither is the
search for workable solutions. In his book National Security
and Individual Freedom, Harold Lasswell concluded in 1950
that American security measures should be the outcome of a
comprehensive process of balancing the costs and benefits of
all relevant policies, basically suggesting a reasonable trading of liberty for security and security for liberty.189 From
today’s ELSI perspective, this solution appears too pragmatic, or utilitarian: According to the 9/11 Commission,
there is only a “false choice” of security vs. liberty, since we
should not have to trade liberty for security.190
Relevant considerations were also present at the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966),
and in further human rights law attempting to balance needs
arising from emergencies that “threaten the life of the nation”
with the risk of limiting the freedoms of a whole population.191 Human rights law though requires these limitations
imposed in order to protect important rights. Further,
“[a]nticipating that declarations of emergency might be used
opportunistically by governments as justification for the
unnecessary limitation of rights, human rights law discourages the declaration of an emergency by governments, and
requires the period of emergency to be as short as possible.
Even in emergencies, certain human rights may not be limited,
according to human rights law. These include the right not to
be tortured and the right not to be discriminated against.”192

It is not trivial of integrate ELSI consideration into everyday homeland security, for a number of additional reasons.
As discussed in this chapter, those include concerns of an
overemphasis of ELSI that in fact weakens efforts to safeguard the homeland; the fact that ELSI integration into
homeland security capabilities and practices may lead to new

challenges and dilemmas; as we as the trend of securitization.
In particular the latter directly relates to justification of
increases in homeland security intelligence, including domestic intelligence: “Throughout US history, in times of national
security crisis, civil liberties have been curtailed in exchange
for perceived greater security, the balance between liberties
and security generally being restored after each crisis.”193
U.S. government efforts to effectively address ELSI,
while not weakening, but strengthening homeland security
missions, are present in a number of ways at a number of
levels. This includes the organizational level, such as the
creation of the Office for Civil Rights and Liberties (CRCL)
within the DHS. It also includes the operational level periodical governmental reporting as mandated by the USA
FREEDOM Act being an example. Efforts further include an
emphasis on the law‐enforcement aspect of homeland security and how it functions as an enabler for the whole‐community approach. DHS has set a focus on Law Enforcement
Partnerships, in the first place emphasizing the role of cooperation in an all‐of‐government approach to countering
domestic terrorism, with an emphasis on social aspects in the
context of community policing:
“Our law enforcement partners at the federal, state, local,
tribal and territorial levels are the backbone of our
nation’s domestic defense against terrorist attacks. They
are this country’s eyes and ears on the ground, and the
first line of detection and prevention. They are a vital
partner in ensuring public safety, in every American
community.”194

Apart from those practical measures of inserting due ELSI
consideration into the homeland security cycle, what seems
to be required are better integrated and more duly considered
professional studies of homeland security policies, strategies,
and capabilities. The best and arguably most justifiable way
of addressing ELSI is by actively researching ethical acceptability, social acceptance, comprehensive legal impact, and
unintended consequences before implementing legislation,
policies, and technological solutions for homeland security.
Aspects to consider include, for instance: formal procedure and public input in the decision to adopt the technology; assessing of the symbolic meaning the use of technology
may imply; reversibility (the use of technology for surveillance should not permanently change state or society);
human review (technology should not be automated and
make decisions without the human in the loop); appropriateness and clarity of goals; proportionality (technology and
information collected should be scaled to the dimension and
impact of the security issue addressed); criteria of selection
for the subject(s) of surveillance; as well as equal access to
and periodic review of surveillance tools.195 As this list
shows, ELSI are best addressed proactively, as opposed to
reactively, which however has been typical of a lot of
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approaches to those issues in homeland security in the
United States. Examples include post‐Katrina emergency
reform legislation and the ex‐post facto reporting mandated
in the USA FREEDOM Act.
Regarding two debates discussed in detail in this chapter
as examples, mass surveillance by NSA and security technology such as UAS, international discussion has best practices
to suggest for consideration in U.S. homeland security:
Based on an analysis of the Snowden case, Amnesty
International and Privacy International recommended general criteria for governments to use in mass surveillance programs in order to proactively address ELSI:
“Governments can have legitimate reasons for using communications surveillance, for example to combat crime or
protect national security. However because surveillance
interferes with the rights to privacy and freedom of expression, it must be done in accordance with strict criteria:
surveillance must be targeted, based on reasonable suspicion, undertaken in accordance with the law, necessary to
meet a legitimate aim and be conducted in a manner that is
proportionate to that aim, and non‐discriminatory. This
means that mass surveillance that indiscriminately collects
the communications of large numbers of people cannot be
justified. Mass surveillance violates both the right to privacy
and to freedom of expression.”196

Regarding concerns about security technologies with
potential to intrude on privacy, security research recommends proactive addressing of ELSI through a privacy‐by‐
design approach:
“Privacy by design is the practice of building privacy protecting features into security practices and technologies to
preempt violations of privacy. For example, a privacy‐by‐
design technique was used to produce socially, legally, and
ethically acceptable body scanners: instead of producing an
image of the naked body, these scanners show operators a
simple line‐drawing of a generic human body, and represent
the location of any suspect object by means of a flashing
light. This simple solution preserves the detection function
of the technology while minimizing the intrusion into bodily
privacy. Privacy‐by‐design principles that now inform technology development include data minimization, which
requires that technology is developed so as to minimize both
the amount of data stored, shared, or analyzed and the length
of time for which it is kept. This mitigates against mission
creep as well as privacy intrusions.”197

However, the potential for conflict among ELSI principles
and procedures becomes evident here, where procedures that
implement due consideration of ELSI could end up working
against the principles of ELSI. Consider the following example: On the one hand, the human in the loop, so as to avoid
unethical or even illegal exposition of humans to non‐human
decisions, made by machines, is an essential ELSI principle.

47

On the other hand, automation has the potential to protect
privacy by reducing the numbers of humans who actually
look at information, thus taking the human out of the loop.
Again, it becomes obvious that there are no handbook solutions to ELSI and that theoretical ELSI concepts will not survive real life contact. Rather, it is important to understand the
ELSI can only be coherently addressed within an understanding of homeland security as a whole‐community effort to
safeguard society’s commonly acquired values.
This effort needs to include addressing of limitations and
unintended consequences of ELSI integration into homeland
security capabilities. For example, published vulnerability
studies, risk assessment frameworks, as well as National
Preparedness Reports may serve to enhance whole‐community
preparedness but may also reveal security gaps. At the same
time, classification of information and lack of transparency of
publicly funded programs may infringe the integrity of the
homeland security policy area, limit the sense of societal/citizen
ownership that homeland security based on a whole‐community approach requires, and harm the integrity of the homeland
security enterprise by giving the appearance of insufficient
commitment to deliver to the people a usable public good of
security, or at least a fair return on tax money investment.
In the final analysis, pragmatic implementation of ELSI consideration in everyday homeland security can best be accomplished by following a number of general principles across
homeland security domains and missions that can be seen as
ingredients of an ELSI‐informed security culture – with the
dimensions of normative values, knowledge and interpretation,
common symbols, and action repertories, as described above:
• Normative values
–– Nurture a normative security culture, rooted in a view
of the citizens being the ultimate owners of homeland
security and vested with unalienable democratic rights;
–– Follow the principle of equal access of the whole
community to homeland security capabilities and
their results, as well as the principle of risk‐proportional use of homeland security capabilities.
• Knowledge and interpretation
–– Supported by research, use a comprehensive approach
to ELSI safeguards: Asses and address ELSI from the
very beginning of the development of a security technology or a policy, in addition to ex‐post reporting on
possible ELSI negligence;
–– Use formal, reviewable procedures and public input
(such as consultation) in the decision to adopt homeland security technology;
–– Assess the harm that a homeland security capability
might cause against its benefits;
–– Establish homeland security workforce as well as
public awareness of risky potentials for excessive and
intruding use of homeland security capabilities.
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• Common symbols
–– Consistently understand homeland security as a public good provided for in joint responsibility of all
members of the homeland security enterprise;
–– Focus on observable facts regarding security needs of
society and disaster‐struck communities, as opposed
to bureaucratic and political construction of disaster;
–– Maintain a legally sound and culturally fair balance
between effectiveness and invasiveness of a homeland
security policies and capabilities, based on a focus on
human and societal needs as opposed to securitization
trends and elite constructions of reality.
• Action repertories
–– As opposed to taking a whole‐community approach
for granted, continuously assess homeland security
activity for inadvertent creation or reproduction of
unequal distribution of security in society;
–– Implement homeland security capabilities in a way
that they become a whole‐community enabler, fostering the societal ownership of homeland security, recognizing that ELSI may be interpreted differently
within and across different security cultures;
–– Maintain a consequentialist perspective together with
a distributive justice perspective to assess and address
unintended consequences of national preparedness
planning and practice, such as unfair strategic advantage to some, or exposing some to higher risks without fair reciprocity.
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